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We analyse the equilibrium of an economy where one of the producers in
the final market is the monopolstic supplier of input needed by both its
owner and competitors, and monopoly pricing behavior of the firm is regu-
lated. Our particular interest is in the pricing of monopoly input which is
supposed to be regulated by the government. Typical examples of the model
include electricity transmissions, access to local telecommunications services
and network provisions in other utility industries.
Two major problems we address in this paper are:
$(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ high should the access price for the downstream firms be compared
with the marginal cost of the upstream supplier ?
$(\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i})\mathrm{I}\mathrm{s}$ free entry to the downstream market desirable ?
With regard to the first problem, we examine Baumol$=\mathrm{W}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}$ efficient
component pricing rule (ECPR) which states that the access charge should
be set roughly by the formula




Here, the opportunity cost is defined to be the reduction in incumbent’s
(monopolist’s) profit caused by the provision of the service.
Pioneering studies are made by Laffont and Tirole$(1993, 2000)$ , Vick-
ers(1995) and Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers(1996) and Economides and
White (1995) among others, and more exact formulae are derived with ad-
ditional features such as the incentive constraint and the monopoly element.
When the budget constraint of the incumbent firm is an issue, their results
are related to the classic Ramsey$=\mathrm{B}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{x}$ markup ratio formula but the
analysis of optimal access charge is fairly complicated even in the case where
the entrants act as price takers.
We study the case where entrants act as Cournot oligopolists as well as
the case where they behave as price takers. We do not assume, to begin
with, that profits of downstream firms are zero as most previous studies did.
In fact, one of our chief objectives is to examine whether or not free entry
(zero profit condition) is desirable from the welfare viewpoint.
As answers to the above problems, we give sufficient conditions under
which the optimal access price is higher than the marginal cost (Propositions
2, 3and 4) and show that entry to the downstream industry tends to be
excessive (Proposition 6). Some specific studies are made in the case of
homogeneous product and in the case of perfectly competitive downstream
market. We will also discuss the implications of classical optimal taxation
literature to the current problem (Proposition 5). It is hoped that our
analysis helps to unify and relate previous results scattered in the literature
of different fields.
2Model
There are two kind of final goods in the economy. Good $\mathrm{Y}$ is produced by the
monopolist $M$ which is regulated by the government. Good $X$ is produced
by asmall number of firms which behave as Cournot oligopolists (or as price
takers as aspecial case).
Formally this does not exclude the possibility that goods $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ are
homogeneous and we will be concerned with this special case occasionally.
The monopolist owns the input(infrastructure) which is necessary for the
production of goods $X$ and Y.
The total utility of the representative consumer who consumes $X$ unit$\mathrm{s}$
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of good $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ units of good $\mathrm{Y}$ and works $L$ hours are expressed as
$W=U(X,\mathrm{Y})+(L_{0}-L)$ , (2.1)
where $L_{0}$ is afixed number indicating the initial endowment of labour. We
assume that $U$ is twice continuously differentiate and set
$P(X, \mathrm{Y})=U_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ (2.2)
and
$Q(X, \mathrm{Y})=U_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ , (2.3)
where the subscripts denote the partial derivatives with respect to the des-
ignated variables. We remark that $P_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})=Q_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ by continuous
differentiability of $U$ , and assume that $U$ is increasing and concave ($W$ is
quasi-concave). These assumptions may be expressed as:
Al
$P(X, \mathrm{Y})>0$ , $Q(X, \mathrm{Y})>0$
$P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})<0$ , $Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})<0$
and
$P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})-P_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot Q_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})>0$ .





$2P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})+P_{XX}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X<0$
$2Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})+Q_{\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}<0$ .
This means that the marginal revenue function of each industry, if monop0-
lized, is positive and decreasing with respect to its own production
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Let x be the output level and $c(x)$ be the corresponding cost of the typical
downstream firm. The aggregate output of these firms is equal to the demand
for the output X. We assume
A3
$c’(x)\geq 0$ , $c’(x)\geq 0$ .
The last condition will be relaxed in some cases.
Let $C(X, \mathrm{Y})$ be the cost function of the upstream firm (monopolist) to
supply the service in the amount $X$ to the downstream firms and to produce
its monopolistic product in the amount Y. We assume
A4
$C(X, \mathrm{Y})$ is increasing in $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ and convex in $(X, \mathrm{Y})$ .
The convexity assumption will be relaxed in some context in the following
discussion.
3Cournot Competition in the $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\vee$
Market
Let $a$ denote the access price of the bottleneck input (infrastructure), the
profit of downstream firm(entrant) $i$ corresponding to the output pair $(X, \mathrm{Y})$
is expressed as
$\pi_{i}=(P(X, \mathrm{Y})-a)x_{i}-c(x_{i})$ . (3.1)
Given $\mathrm{Y}$ and $a$ , and assuming the Cournot behavior and the interior
solution, the first order conditions for profit maximization are expressed as
$P(X, \mathrm{Y})+P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot x_{i}=a$ $+c’(x_{i})$ , all $i$ . (3.2)
From (3.1) and(3.2) we note the following:
Remarks
(i) $P\geq a+C(x)/x$ if $\pi_{i}$ is positive
(ii) $P\geq a+c’$ if $P_{X}$ is negativ$\mathrm{e}$
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Now letting n denote the number of the downstream firms and assuming
the symmetric solution (x $=x_{i}$ for all i), we have
$X=nx$ (3.3)
and
$nP(X, \mathrm{Y})+P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X=$
.
$n(a+c’(x))$ . (3.4)
We may rewrite (3.4) as
$a=P(X, \mathrm{Y})+P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot x-c’(X/n)$ . (3.3)
Thus there exists aunique access price $a$ that is compatible with the out.-
put pair $(X, \mathrm{Y})$ . It turns out more convenient to interpret the first order
condition in this way, rather than in the other way round, $i$ , $\mathrm{e}.$ , given $\mathrm{Y}$ and
$a$ , (3.4) determines industry output $X$. Of course these two interpretations
are equivalent since the right hand side of (3.5) is amonotone function of $X$
under our assumptions. In fact, we have
$\frac{\partial a}{\partial X}=$ $((n+1)P_{X}+P_{XX}\cdot X-c"(x))/n$ . (3.6)
We also have
$\frac{\partial a}{\partial \mathrm{Y}}=P_{\mathrm{Y}}+P_{X\mathrm{Y}}\cdot x$ (3.7)
Thus $\partial a/\partial X<0$ if good $X$ and good $\mathrm{Y}$ are strategic substitutes in con-
sumption in the sense that an increase in $\mathrm{Y}$ decreases the marginal revenue
$P+P_{X}X$ of $X$ .
If the downstream industry is competitive,(3.5) reduces to
$a=P(X, \mathrm{Y})-c’(X/n)$ (3.8)
and this implies that
$\frac{\partial a}{\partial X}=P_{X}-c$” $(x)/n$. (3.9)
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$\frac{\partial a}{\partial \mathrm{Y}}=P_{\mathrm{Y}}$ . (3.10)
The profit of the monopolist corresponding to the output pair $(X, \mathrm{Y})$ is
given by
$\Pi(X, \mathrm{Y})=a(X, \mathrm{Y})X+Q(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C(X, \mathrm{Y})$
where $a=a(X, \mathrm{Y})$ is defined in (3.5).The first term represents the income
from the access charge of the network, the second term, the revenue from the
sale of the product, while the third term is the total cost of the supply of the
products $X$ and Y.
For future reference, we record the derivatives of the profit function with
respect to $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ :
$\Pi_{X}=a(X, \mathrm{Y})+a_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X+Q_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ (3.11)
$\Pi_{\mathrm{Y}}=a_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X+Q(X, \mathrm{Y})+aY(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ . (3.12)
In the above expressions
$a_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot$ $X=(n+1)P_{X}\cdot X/n+P_{XX}\cdot X^{2}/n-c$” $\cdot$ $x$ (3.13)
and
$a_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X=P_{\mathrm{Y}}X+.P_{X\mathrm{Y}}X^{2}/n$ . (3.14)
4Cournot Competition in the Product Mar-
kets and the Optimal Access Price
With regard to the behavior of the incumbent (the monopolistic supplier
of the input) and the regulatory objective of the government, we consider
two hypothetical situations. In this section we assume that the incumbent
competes with entrants in the product markets as aCournot oligopolist tak-
ing the access price $a$ as given and using $\mathrm{Y}$ as its strategic variable. This
assumption is made by Economides and White (1995) among others
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Under this market condition, access price a is set by the government so
as to maximize the social welfare (total surplus) defined by
$W(X, \mathrm{Y})=U(X, \mathrm{Y})-C(X, \mathrm{Y})-nc(X/n)$ , (4.1)
In the next section, we consider the problem of maximizing the social wel-
fare subject to an incentive constraint (budget constraint) of the incumbent
assuming Cournot behaviors of the entrants.
When the access price $a$ is fixed, the profit of the incumbent is written as
$\Pi(X, \mathrm{Y})=(a-Q(X, \mathrm{Y}))\mathrm{Y}-C(X, \mathrm{Y})$ , (4.2)
Hence the maximization of the profit given $X$ (Cournot competition assump-
tion) yields
$Q(X, \mathrm{Y})+Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\mathrm{Y}=C_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ (4.3)
On the other hand, corresponding to each output pair $(X,\mathrm{Y})$ , there
exists the unique access price
$a(X, \mathrm{Y})=P(X, \mathrm{Y})+P_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})X/n-c’(X/n)$ (4.4)
which is consistent with the Cournot equilibrium condition of the entrants’
market (see the discussion following (3,5)).
We now introduce the marginal profit function
$G(X, \mathrm{Y})=Q(X, \mathrm{Y})+Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\mathrm{Y}-CY\{X,$ $\mathrm{Y}$ ) (4.5)
of the incumbent with respect to its controlled variable Y. Thus $G(X, \mathrm{Y})=$
$\Pi_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ .
Differentiating with respect to $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ , we have
$G_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})=Q_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})+Q_{\mathrm{Y}X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\mathrm{Y}-C_{\mathrm{Y}X}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ (4.1)
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$G_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})=2Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})+Q_{\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\mathrm{Y}-C_{\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}}(X,$Y) (4.7)
Now the government’s problem is to choose $a=a(X, \mathrm{Y})$ , so as to max-
imize the welfare function(4.1) subject to Cournot equilibrium conditions
(4.3) and (4.4). Since $a$ is agiven function of $(X, \mathrm{Y})$ , we need only
choose $(X, \mathrm{Y})$ optimally under constraint (4.3) which is conveniently written
as $G(X, \mathrm{Y})=0$
Writing the Lagrangian of the problem as
$\mathcal{L}$ $=U(X, \mathrm{Y})-C(X, \mathrm{Y})-nc(X/n)+\lambda G(X, \mathrm{Y})$ (4.8)




Hence eliminating Aand using (4.3) we derive
$P-C_{X}-d$ $=-Q_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}G_{X}/G_{\mathrm{Y}}$ (4.11)
Also using (4.4) and (4.11) we have
$a=P+P_{X}\cdot x-c’4.12$ (4.12)
$=$ $(P-C_{X}-c’)+(P_{X}\cdot x+C_{X})$
$=$ $-Q_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}G_{X}/G_{\mathrm{Y}}+P_{X}\cdot$ $x+C_{X}$ .
We call that good $X$ and good $\mathrm{Y}$ are strategic substitutes in production if
$\Pi_{X\mathrm{Y}}<0$ (i.e. $G_{X}<0$ ) and strategic complements if $\Pi_{X\mathrm{Y}}>0$ (i.e. $G_{X}>0$
$)$ . $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ are independent goods if $\Pi_{X\mathrm{Y}}=0$ (i.e. $G_{X}=0$ ).
We note that $G_{\mathrm{Y}}<0$ from our assumptions A2 and A4. Hence, in view
of (4.11), we are ready to state our basic result on the relationship between
the price of good $X$ and its direct and indirect cost $\mathrm{s}$
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$\frac{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}1}{P>C_{X}+d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$
$P<C_{X}+d$ depending on whether goodsX and $\mathrm{Y}$ are
strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
From (4.12) we can also infer the relationship between the access price
and its indirect cost:
$\frac{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}2}{a<C_{X}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{s}$
$X$ and good $\mathrm{Y}$ are strategic complements. Also, if the
downstream market is competitive, $a<C_{X}$ or $a>C_{X}$ depending on whether
goods $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ are strategic substitutes or complements.
5Welfare Maximization Under the Revenue
Constraint of the Monopolist
We next introduce the revenue (incentive) constraint and consider the prob-
lem of maximizing the welfare function
$W=U(X, \mathrm{Y})-C(X, \mathrm{Y})-nc(X/n)$ . (5.1)
See, Laffont and Tirole(1983 and 2000) and Armstrong ,Doyle and Vickers
(1996) among others.
Under the Cournot equilibrium conditions in the entrants’ market, the
constraint may be written as
$\Pi(X, \mathrm{Y})=a(X, \mathrm{Y})X+Q(X, \mathrm{Y})$
.
$\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C(X, \mathrm{Y})\geq 0$ (5.2)
where $a(X, \mathrm{Y})$ is defined by (4.4).
We set the Lagrangian of the constrained maximization problem as
$\mathcal{L}=U(X, \mathrm{Y})-C(X, \mathrm{Y})-nc(X/n)+\mathrm{X}\mathrm{U}\{\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{Y}$) (5.3)
and differentiating with respect to $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ , obtain
$P(X, \mathrm{Y})-C_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})-c’(x)+\mathrm{X}\mathrm{U}\{\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{Y}$) $=0$ (5.4)
and
$Q(X, \mathrm{Y})-C_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})+\lambda\Pi_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})=0$ (5.5)
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(5.5) may be expressed as
$Q(X, \mathrm{Y})-C_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})=-\theta(a_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot$ $X+Q_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ . Y) (5.6)
where
$\theta=\frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}$ (5.7)
Also using(3.12)(5.4) may be expressed as
$P-C_{X}$ $- c’=-\lambda(a+a_{X}\cdot X+Q_{X}\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C_{X})$ ,
$=-\lambda(P+P_{X}x-c’+. a_{X}X+P_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}-C_{X})$ . (5.8)
In the case where the budget constraint is not binding, the formula for
the optimal access price takes on avery simple form.
$\frac{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}3}{\mathrm{W}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$
constraint is not imposed, the price of product is related
to their marginal costs as $P=C_{X}+d$ . Also, the optimal access price $a$ is
expressed as $a=P_{X}\cdot x+C_{X}$ . Hence $a<C_{X}$ .




The formula is slightly different from that in Proposition 2. Since $\mathrm{Y}$ is
now controlled optimally by the government, whereas in the former case $\mathrm{Y}$
is chosen by the monopolist who competes with rivals in the downstream
markets.
The general formula(5.8) may also be written as
$(1+\lambda)(P-C_{X}-c’)=-\lambda(P_{X}x+a_{X}X+P_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y})$




From this and relation (3.6) we have
$a=-(P-C_{X}-c’)/\theta+(P-P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y})-((n+1)P_{X}\cdot X+P_{XX}\cdot X^{2}/n)-(c’-c"\cdot x)$
(5.10)
In the benchmark case of perfect competition in the downstream industry,
(5.10) reduces to
$a=-(P-C_{X}-c’)/\theta+(P-P_{X}\cdot X+P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y})-(c’-c"\cdot x)$ (5.11)




Let the utility function be of form $W=U(X, \mathrm{Y})+(L_{0}-L_{1})$ . Given the
price $p$ of good $X$ and the price $q$ of good $\mathrm{Y}$ , let the demand functions $X(p,q)$
and $\mathrm{Y}(p, q)$ be defined as the solutions of $p=P(X,\mathrm{Y})=U_{X}(.X, \mathrm{Y}),q=$
$Q(X, \mathrm{Y})=U_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})$ . Also, define the ordinary elasticities of demand by
$\epsilon_{XX}(p, q)=-pX_{p}/X$ , $\epsilon_{X\mathrm{Y}}(p, q)=-pX_{q}/\mathrm{Y}$ etc.
and the inverse elasticities of demand as
$\epsilon_{XX}^{-}(X, \mathrm{Y})=-XP_{X}/P$, $\epsilon_{X\mathrm{Y}}^{-}(X, \mathrm{Y})=-XP_{\mathrm{Y}}/Q$ etc.
It then follows that




$\epsilon_{\overline{\mathrm{Y}}X}=\epsilon_{X\mathrm{Y}}/\Delta$ , $\epsilon_{\overline{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}}=\epsilon_{XX}/\Delta$ (6.1)
where $\Delta=\epsilon_{XX}\cdot\epsilon_{\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}}-\epsilon_{\mathrm{Y}X}\cdot\epsilon_{X\mathrm{Y}}$
If $px+qy+(L_{0}-L)=M$ where $M$ is fixed number (income) where
$l$ $=L_{0}-L$ is the leisure chosen as the numeraire and $M$ is afixed, we also
have
$\epsilon_{ix+:\mathrm{Y}}\epsilon+\epsilon_{iL}=0$ $(i=X, \mathrm{Y})$ (6.2)
where $\epsilon_{XL}=L_{p}/XL$ .
Proof)
From $P(X, \mathrm{Y})=p$ and $Q(X. , \mathrm{Y})=q$ we derive
$(\begin{array}{ll}P_{X} P_{\mathrm{Y}}Q_{X} Q_{\mathrm{Y}}\end{array})(\begin{array}{ll}X_{P} X_{Q}\mathrm{Y}_{P} \mathrm{Y}_{Q}\end{array})=(\begin{array}{ll}\mathrm{l} 00 1\end{array})$
.
Hence we have
$(\begin{array}{ll}XP_{X}/P XP_{\mathrm{Y}}/Q\mathrm{Y}Q_{X}/P \mathrm{Y}Q_{\mathrm{Y}}/Q\end{array})=(PX_{p}/XQ\mathrm{Y}_{p}\oint X$ $PX_{q}/\mathrm{Y}Q\mathrm{Y}_{q}/\mathrm{Y})^{-1}$
(6.1) then follows from the definitions of ordinary and inverse elasticities.
To establish (6.2) we use the budget equation
$pX+q\mathrm{Y}+l=M$,
Differentiating with respect to $p$ we have
$pX_{p}+q\mathrm{Y}_{q}-L_{p}^{\cdot}=0$ .
Hence it follows that
$- \frac{p}{X}X_{p}+\frac{q}{X}\mathrm{Y}_{p}.+\frac{1}{X}L_{p}=0$ ,
which means (6.2) for $i=X$ . The case where $i=\mathrm{Y}$ is shown similarly
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7 Optimal Access Pricing of the Competi-
tive Downstream Market Under the Bud-
get Constraint
In the case where the downstream market is competitive (or contestable) ,













$P-c’-C_{X}=-\theta(P_{X}\cdot X+P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y}-c^{n}\cdot x)$ (7.3)
$Q-C_{\mathrm{Y}}=-\theta(P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot X+Q_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y})$ . (7.4)
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Lemma 2In the competitive case, 0is positive if the prices are so set
that the aggregate revenue of the industry exceeds the cost payments, that
is if
$R=P(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X+Q(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}-C_{X}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot X-C_{\mathrm{Y}}(X, \mathrm{Y})\cdot \mathrm{Y}-c’(x)\cdot X$
is positive
proof) In view of (7.3) and(7.4) we have
$R=(P-C_{X}-c’)X+(Q-C_{\mathrm{Y}})\mathrm{Y}$
$=-\theta[P_{X}\cdot X+P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y}-c"\cdot x)X+(P_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot X+Q_{\mathrm{Y}}\cdot \mathrm{Y})\mathrm{Y}]$
$=-\theta(U_{XX}X^{2}+2UXy\cdot X\mathrm{Y}+U_{\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}^{2}-nc"\cdot x^{2})$ (7.3)
This is positive under our assumptions.
Remark
Since $\Pi(X, \mathrm{Y})-R=(a-P)\cdot X+(C-C_{X}X-C_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y})=(C-C_{X}X-C_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y})$
in the case where the downstream market is competitive, we have $\Pi(X, \mathrm{Y})\geq$
$R$ if $C\geq C_{X}X-C_{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{Y}.\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ condition is satisfied if the technology of the
monopolistic supplier of input exhibits non-decreasing returns to scale.









We may state the another important result of our analysis. This is stated
somewhat differently from the corresponding statements in Laffont and Tirole
$(1993, 2000)$ and Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996).
Proposition 4
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Optimal access price is higher than the direct cost of the product by the
amount
$(\theta(e_{XX}^{-}+e_{\mathrm{Y}X}^{-})+\theta c^{2}(x))/P(X)$ .
The proof follows from (7.6) and the expression for $m_{X}$ .










Hence we can state:
$\frac{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}5}{\mathrm{O}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}1\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{k}$
-up ratio of the industry $X$ must be higher than that of
industry $\mathrm{Y}$ provided that $c$” $(x)\geqq 0$ and $\epsilon_{XL}>\epsilon_{\mathrm{Y}L}$ (if commodity $X$ is more
complementary to the numeraire good than commodity $\mathrm{Y}$ is). If $c$” $(x)\leqq 0$
and $\epsilon_{XL}<\epsilon_{\mathrm{Y}L}$ the reverse conclusion holds.
We remark that asimilar result has been obtained by Corlett and Hague
(1988) and Diamond Mirrlees (1971) in adifferent context.
8Effect of Entry in the Competitive Case
with the Budget Constraint
We next consider the effect of entry of firms to the downstream market.




In the competitive case, $\Pi_{n}=-c$” $(x)x^{2}$ and so
$\frac{d\mathcal{L}}{dn}=-c(x)+c’(x)x+\lambda c$” $(x)x^{2}$ .
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This establishes the following propositions
Proposition 6
Entry to the downstream industry is excessive even when the downstream
industry is competitive (access price is taken as given) if the upstream in-
dustry is regulated.




Hence optimal entry is assured if integer problem is neglected
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